Getting To Know Our New Pakistan Policy…

For right now, Obama’s stated policy towards Pakistan is very general, mostly limited to those statements he’s made, and the recent attacks in Mumbai means we need to put his Pakistan policy within a tighter focus of concentration. In order to throw some daylight on the it will likely be useful to look at John Podesta’s (current head of Obama’s transition team) group the Center for American Progress, to figure out possible future American policies towards Pakistan. CAP’s policies are here, and here are some interesting proposals that may be a break from the past:

Implement policies that recognize the regional dimension of Pakistan’s security challenge. Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan are inextricably linked, and U.S. policy must be formulated accordingly. The situation in Afghanistan is directly affected by instability along Pakistan’s western borders, and longstanding Pakistan-India tensions have affected the Pakistani military’s strategic calculus in curtailing militancy within Pakistan. For too long, the United States has pursued disconnected Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India policies, rather than create a coordinated regional strategy. Any regional approach must address Pakistan’s security concerns with India, specifically related to Kashmir and Afghanistan. These regional challenges will require a fundamentally different U.S. approach that eliminates the bureaucratic separation in Washington between diplomacy, development, intelligence, and military activities in Islamabad, Kabul, and New Delhi.
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Approach Pakistan’s military establishment in ways that support good governance and economic development. The United States should continue to strengthen relations with Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies, but do so in a way that does not undermine civilian control and political reform in Pakistan. The United States should support and interact with the Pakistani military establishment with policies that encourage Pakistani civilian oversight. This means engaging with its military as a component of the government as a whole rather than as an autonomous institution, allocating more funding through the government of Pakistan and not the Pakistani military, and meeting Pakistani military officials while keeping Pakistani civilian leadership informed or present. U.S. funding to Pakistan’s military should be targeted toward specific shared objectives, and tied to performance, such as good faith efforts by the Pakistani military to crack down on militant groups in Pakistan, and to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.
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Support democratic transition in Pakistan without picking favored candidates or political parties. The United States should support broader political reform in Pakistan, along with economic development programs and efforts to enhance security. The 2008 parliamentary elections represented an opportunity for Pakistan to give voice to the Pakistani people in how their society is governed. Yet the return of electoral democracy adds a new element of uncertainty to the continuity of leadership in Pakistan. At times Pakistani leaders may voice opposition to American policies, but the United States should resist the urge to circumvent them now and in the future. The upcoming local elections in 2009 represent another opportunity to support Pakistan’s democratic transition, and the United States should expand efforts to support civil society organizations, assist all political parties, and encourage electoral reform to ensure that these elections meet their potential for providing an open and fair debate on key policy questions and allowing for the legitimate expression of the will of the people.
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Enhance transparency and accountability of U.S. funds. The United States must demand more transparency over its funding and tie its assistance to specific, agreed- upon objectives, such as good faith efforts by the Pakistani military to crack down on militant groups in Pakistan, and to stop cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. For too long, U.S. aid to Pakistan’s military has been characterized by its lack of accountability, transparency, and shortsightedness. Despite distributing more than $11 billion since 2001 to Pakistan, the United States has not demanded transparency or an accounting of its funding.7 (See Appendix for a breakdown of overt U.S. funding.) The U.S. Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, found in June 2008 that there had been insufficient oversight over U.S. Coalition Support Funds to Pakistan, a fund to reimburse Pakistan for its counterterrorism activities (and also the fund through which the majority of U.S. monies were allocated). Furthermore, U.S. assistance continued to flow directly to the Pakistani military despite evidence that it was not aggressively attacking insurgent elements in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and that linkages continued to exist between the military establishment, especially its intelligence agency-the ISI-and militant groups.

I’ve outlined these four proposals because I think they represent the greatest break from prior policies. Indeed, if Obama really wants to make greater use of American soft power to further our interests, mediating between Pakistan and India in Kashmir would be an excellent place. We’ve certainly put less value on mediation there than in say, Palestine in the past, and neither country have necessarily always wanted us there. But if India/Pakistan relationships directly affect Pakistan/Afghanistan relations, then its time we recognize that its within our national interests to mediate there, and intervene to what extent we can.

The last three policies have to do with the new Pakistani government’s legitimacy. It’s not exactly secret the extent to which we supported Musharaf, and while the military establishment still plays a powerful role in Pakistani government its important that we don’t look like we are trying to set up any puppet military governments. The same is true with any particular parties or politicians; though continued propping up of the democratic government, even if Islamicist parties gain greater and greater control. Its time that as an American foreign policy we stop denying that these countries are in fact Muslim, and that Islam calls for religious influence (or control) of government. What we need to focus on is mediating the extremist influences and make sure we have moderate Islamic governments, by reinforcing democratic institutions.

Finally, a lack of transparency in our funds towards their military helps no one but our enemies. It’s well known we’ve provided their military with money and hardware, and secrecy just reinforces distrust of our role in the region.

I recommend everyone peruse the remainder of the document, but I really think organizations like CAP, and people like Jim Jones will be those in the future administration with the most influence over our Pakistan policies, and not Hillary. Besides having limited experience in this particular part of the world, she was also the one who voted for Iraq, reducing focus on this region, meaning her prioritizing in this region may be a bit skewed; something Obama has emphasized repeatedly.

-Marc-

Update: In2thefray gives us the STRAFOR analysis.